There's a story about a Chassidic Rebbe (I believe it was about Rabbi Nachum of Chernobyl, who was a heavy-set man) who sat down in a wicker chair. The wicker chair wasn't able to bear his weight, and it tore, with the Rebbe falling through the webbing of the chair.
He mused: "It seems I'm a tzaddik as great as Ya'akov Avinu! When I sat on the chair, the holes in the seat started to argue: each one wanted that I should sit on it! So, they all decided to become one big hole, and I fell through!"
I wish I knew where to find all of these “letters and pamphlets” as the topic of peshat and drash is one that is very interesting for me.
I find this whole controversy to be very disturbing. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding on the definition of “peshat” and the nature of Rashi’s commentary on the Torah. The scholarly studies on these topics are vast with probably hundreds of academic articles written on them. Generally, “peshat” or “peshto shel mikrah” as understood by the Rishonim and later commentators is understood to be the plain meaning of the text, taking into account elements such as grammar, syntax, and most importantly context. Rashi’s commentary is often assumed to be a peshat commentary, but this idea should be surprising to anyone familiar with it as it consists of about 2/3 midrashic material. This misunderstanding is based on a partial reading of Rashi’s programmatic statement that he makes on Beraishis 3:8 – “אני לא באתי אלא לפשוטו של מקרא ולאגדה המתישבת דברי המקרא”. For some reason people only see the first half of this statement and think that Rashi is only coming to explain peshat. But he is actually saying that he is doing two things: peshat and midrashim. Many of Rashi’s comments include both aspects, for example, in parshas Shemos “ותשלח את אמתה”. Most school children know the midrash that Rashi quotes from the Talmud that Paroh’s daughter’s arm miraculously extended, but Rashi also states a peshat comment that אמתה refers to her maidservant. From the many examples where Rashi contrasts peshat and derash we can see the difference between them. In the example of the rocks arguing it is clear that Rashi himself would consider this one of his midrashic interpretations. So for someone to argue that we must accept Rashi’s comment as peshat is quite bizarre.
Incidentally, the chumash פשוטו של מקרא is not an exclusively peshat oriented work. Several of its interpretations are midrashic, for example, that the servant Avraham sent to find a wife for Yitzchak was Eliezer and that when the Torah describes Yaakov as a “dweller of tents” it means he was learning torah. So I don’t understand the fervent opposition to this chumash as it seems the authors are not staunchly ideological peshatists, but rather suggest peshat interpretations where Rashi quotes midrashic ones. It should be no more controversial than the Rashbam’s commentary.
You wonder if R. Feldman actually believes that the world was supernatural long ago, or if he "believes that he believes it, even if he doesn’t actually believe it." Myself, I wonder the same thing about your claim that your personal issues caused "hundreds and possibly thousands of people [to leave] the charedi world". I would have spat out my drink in laugher, had I been drinking when I read it. Do you actually believe yourself so important, or do you merely believe you believe it, even if you don't actually believe it?
It has nothing to do with my being important, it's about the Gedolim revealing themselves to be so anti-science and rational thought. I was contacted by many, many people who told me that they left the charedi world as a result. Some moved into YU-type circles, others left Orthodox altogether.
The STORC/RNS ban was a historic tragedy, and I already know not through you of people who were lost to Judaism through it to various degrees. But one thing fascinates me, how far did they move? Did anyone move from all the way from Meah Shearim to Dizengof? I think not. From NIRC to YU, or from YU to YCT, or from YCT to JTS, or from JTS to HUC—I don't know all these places from up close—sounds more likely. Or someone on the way to becoming a Baal Teshuva, not yet anchored, and the ban exploded in their face. What is the furthest anyone moved? Had they been deeply ensconced in their strata, at the fringe, or in between?
(I'm also wondering if lately you've had less time to compose your posts and monitor the comments. There's been something different about them recently, not sure exactly what.)
R' Feldman said a fundamental of Judaism is that miracles were commonplace for the Avos. In your paraphrase that somehow gets twisted into a totally different statement, that a fundamental of Judaism is that stones are sentient. These are two very different ideas. I'm surprised to see you grossly misrepresent what R' Feldman said. Whether open miracles were in fact commonplace for the Avos can legitimately be questioned, but there's no need to distort R' Feldman's position.
On a related note, I'm not sure why you think it is specifically a Charedi maximalist view of miracles that drives people away from Judaism. You mock "extraordinary and bizarre miracles", but fundamentally we frum Jews accept extraordinary miracles. In a sense, the rest of the discussion is simply details around how often and for whom miracles occur. For someone struggling with Orthodox Judaism in the modern world and wondering where there is room for miracles in an orderly, scientific universe, does it really matter whether he is being asked to accept the Charedi view that stones talked or the more modest view you propose where you "only" have to accept ten plagues, the sea splitting, and food miraculously provided in the middle of the desert six days a week for forty years? Somehow I don't think so.
1. He says that it is crucial to teach that these stones were sentient. I wrote that I don't know whether he believes this to be true of stones in general. On further reflection, he likely means that it was specifically these stones that miraculously became sentient.
2. Yes, fundamentally Judaism accepts miracles. However, (A) they are usually naturalized to a lesser or greater degree - including the plagues, the splitting of the sea, and even the manna; and (B) these are miracles that are highlighted in the Torah as being of tremendous national importance, not weird stories about sentient stones which isn't even explicitly mentioned.
1. Sorry, where do you see that? He says "From the commentary it emerges that the Avos were not accustomed to miracles (the stones did not say about Jacob "may the righteous one's head rest upon me", and his journey was not miraculously shortened)". He's saying it is important to teach that the Avos were accustomed to miracles, and cites two examples of such miracles brought by Rashi and omitted by the commentary. The important point is not the stories themselves, but what they illustrate about the Avos. He is clearly not saying that the stories in isolation are fundamental to Judaism.
2. Fair point. Still, I think the conflicts between the modern Western world and religion are fundamental conflicts. The distance between Charedi beliefs and say Modern Orthodox beliefs is much less than the distance between a religious and secular worldview. And for people living in the Western world, the questions that arise from the conflict between religion and secularism come up regardless of whether you believe in the literalness of any particular midrash. I know people who have given up their faith who were educated with and without these Charedi beliefs. I just don't think it makes a difference.
1. Do you not know how to read?? He explicitly says nisim. But I already know of your reading abilities from your discussion with Mecharker regarding the Tashbetz 😂
2A. You can "naturalize" this miracle too, if it happened, no less than the Plagues and the Splitting of the Sea.
2B. What is the logic here? Miracles can only happen if they reach some arbitrary degree of importance decided by yourself? Because in your uninformed opinion, this miracle wouldn't have had enough significance and is just "weird"?? And why is the fact that it isn't explicitly mentioned important, do you believe in Torah She'baal Peh? And do you believe in miracles that ARE explicitly mentioned, like the Mabul?
Another example of folks with too much time on their hands. Find something more productive to accomplish, like arguing about how many malochim might be able to dance on the head of a pin.
When I see religious doctrinal debates engaging in unfalsifiable
delusional mythology, it wonders me in the least why so many Jews have gone OTD. Or decided never to have entered The Derech in the first place.
I think all religious people who are serious about their religion accept irrational ideas (like miracles.) But, it's for one reason, above all others: it insulates the person from being argued out of belief.
I can argue with a person that the historical stories of the origins of his religion are tenuous, and not well supported by any historical methodology or findings. I can argue that his own commitment to the story of the genesis of his religion is not rooted in logic, but in emotion. But, if he crosses the divide and simply accepts the irrational, he nullifies the idea of arguing, completely. He insulates himself from that part of his mind that thinks, and embraces that part of his mind that has desires, needs, fears, and love for his religion.
This acceptance of miracles is the perfect element in every religion - because it isn't subject to any kind of objective analysis.
From a rational point of view, it is incredibly childish - but equally incredibly powerful and enjoyable.
It's the child grabbing the shiny toy of his friend in the playpen, calling it his own, and playing with it selfishly. It's the same child tossing the toy aside, calling it his friend's again, when it breaks, or requires putting away. It’s having it both ways, and not apologizing for it - like small children are known to do.
It's why so many "sane" people - in order to keep their sanity and sense of real fairness and aversion to solipsism - back away from religion.
And it is equally why every religion INSISTS on having miracles, and irrational, unreasoned, elements -- these qualities are impervious, beyond argument, delicious, fun, and powerful.
To go back to the child in us – believing in miracles makes you the kid two grades above, trouncing all the kids around him in basketball, and loving every delicious moment of being the "best player in the world."
To believe in the miracles of your religion is to feel the ultimate truth of your life, above the lives of all others.
To “snap out” of this irrational belief, is to take the same kid, and watch him now cry as he is mercilessly crushed by kids two grades above him. It is the same as when one comes to doubt his own religion. There can be a lot of pain to taking on the job of thinking, and not simply believing in the salve of the irrational. (Maybe that’s why people in great pain sometimes turn to religion, or “discover” G-d.)
The rational moment is quite the downer. Much more fun to be the miracle player crushing all competition and feeling quite powerful! Which would any of us rather be? How would any of us rather feel? Believing in miracles can make us downright giddy. Why would we all enjoy a good hashgacha pratis story, otherwise?
Of course, the whole idea of becoming a grown up is to deal with reality a little bit better than we did as children. But, it's sort of no fun to think too much. Back to the miracles, the religious community, the “heads I win, tails you lose” way of enjoying life. I remember it fondly.
(I do wish I could be alive for the end of the millennia. I understand moshiach is to arrive by then. I know what will happen: the rabbis will reinterpret as the date draws near. When moshiach does not arrive, the new interpretation (“it’s a thousand more years, dummy!”) will supplant the old one. The show must go on, as they say.)
Now, if moshiach does one day arrive, that would be fun, too.
I was searching for information about the Sadkhin Complex last week and one of the top google search results was the Imamother website. While one is generally restricted from searching within the website unless one is a member, unrestricted pages are apparently viewable by the google bot.
Anyway, the Sadkhin Complex is a pseudoscientific method of weight loss / control that combines, according to their own terminology, "restrictive dieting and acupuncture techniques." According to someone assessing this method from a scientific perspective, the pejorative "starving and bull$h*t" terminology is preferred. And this was basically the debate that raged on the Imamother discussion board. One woman was telling a story about how her aunt or her cousin or her neighbor had used this method successfully, while another woman replied that anecdotes don't suffice as evidence and that of course if you starve yourself you'll lose weight, regardless of which pressure points you engage, or if you rub your eyes or pick your nose, etc. Someone attacked this method of weight loss because as soon as you reach your target weight and discontinue the diet, you gain the weight back, to which another replied that that's not a sufficient slam on this diet because that's how all diets work -- you need to actually adopt a new lifestyle of eating and balance that with exercise. If you think you'll just eat this or that at this time of day, then that's not how you maintain or lose weight in a sustainable manner.
It seemed that there was a real discussion there relating to how to evaluate what works, how it works (if it does, indeed, work), how we know it works and so forth and so on. And then you scrolled down and there was an unrelated post offering to put your name on a tehillim list, and I thought that the contrast was intriguing.
logical fallacy known as ad hominem, used effectively by cult groomers. Nice to have something to fall back on, if whatever you do now doesn't work out...
If I'm blunt you win, if I'm nice I lose. As I have no credibility, check with a third party or the mirror if your comments were just as ad hominem as mine, just longer and more thorough, and more unambiguously negative.
The midrash upon which Rashi is based is reading the pesukim carefully. Pasuk 11 says ויקח מאבני המקום, while Pasuk 18 says ויקח את האבן. The midrash also presumes that מאבני ("from the rocks") means Yaakov took more than one. (This is where - without seeing the sefer - I assume there is a difference of opinion as to what is פשוטו של מקרא.) If that's the case, then he started with many rocks and ended up with one. *That* is where the midrash then explains how many rocks turned into one rock. (The opposite is the case with the midrash about hitting one צפרדע and it becoming multiple צפרדעים.)
Once the pesukim say what they do, the midrash then looks to teach us something about Yaakov based on the many rocks to one rock.
The Maharal states that Vashti could not possibly have grown a tale. It means she put on weight. Because if she really grew a tail, that would be a neis niglah, and purim was a neis nistar.
There are other instances in Chazal of inanimate things "speaking".
For example, there is the story of the repentance of Rabbi Elazar Ben Durdaya (Avodah Zarah 17a). He asks from the mountains to intercede for him and ask for mercy from Heaven to forgive his sins. He then turns to Heaven and Earth to intercede, the sun and the moon, the stars and the constellations. When they all respond with a verse saying that they are also transient and can't help him, he weeps out of sincere repentance, until he passes away. A Heavenly Voice announces that he has merited Olam HaBa.
(I think the same conversation appears with Moshe in Midrash Rabba, Parshat Vaetchanan, where he prays to enter Eretz Yisrael and is refused.)
A much more popular one might be the moon complainingאִ"אֶ לִשְׁנֵי מְלָכִים שֶׁיִשְׁתַּמְּשׁוּ בְכֶתֶר אֶחָד and then a solution to that being עַל יְדֵי שֶׁמִּעֵט אֶת הַלְּבָנָה הִרְבָּה צְבָאָיהָ לְהָפִיס דַּעְתָּהּ.
It's tough to say exactly what people at the time of Rashi knew and didn't know, but Giordano Bruno seems to have been the first, or one of the first, to propose that stars were distant suns. Quora seems to turn it around, explaining that the breakthrough was rather to realize that our sun was merely a very close star. I'm not astronomically informed enough to appreciate the real difference here.
Abraham Joshua Heschel's Heavenly Torah explains quite nicely how the Akivan and Ishmaelian routes of explanation form a thread throughout the Talmud on mystical and rationalist sides of the story. I sent R' Jeremy Wieder an email asking him if what he thought about this perspective and he said that he is unsure of the validity of such an approach. (So I have documentation, in case someone is writing a Wikipedia article.) But the book was very helpful is explaining the two sides...a predecessor, let's call it, of R' Slifkin's most recent work.
R' Ishmael, he explains, says that these things were never meant to be taken literally and were just stories introduced to cater to the unintelligent masses. It's difficult to see, from Heschel's perspective, whether R' Akiva thought the same thing, but was the one catering to the masses, or if he actually believed them. I wonder about the view that maintains these Kiplingesque explanations as actual historical documentation.
For more on Rashbam's opinion of Rashi's commentary to Chumash, see his peirush to Shemos 40:35. For more on his attitude toward midreshei Chazal, see his peirush to Vayikra 13:2.
Yes, because of the lessons contained therein, NOT because it's pshat.
The Rashbam harshly criticizes Rashi for presenting drash as pshat:
"The polemic with Rashi is reflected in another surprising way: in several places Rashbam attacked Rashi's commentary in sharp, scathing language, and even though he did not mention Rashi by name, there is no doubt that the Rashbam's readers knew very well to whom he was referring. Such is the case in the commentary on Genesis 49:9: “Judah is a lion's whelp; from the prey, my son [mi-teref beni], you have gone up. He crouches down, he stretches out like a lion, like a lioness—who dares rouse him up?” Rashi, following Bereshit Rabbah, understood Jacob's words to Judah to be the attack on Joseph, while Rashbam assumed that they referred to a prophecy about the future. Rashbam added the following comment: “Whoever explains this phrase as referring to the sale of Joseph has no understanding of either the context of the verse or the punctuation of the cantillation signs.” The sharpness of this comment has led several scholars to doubt that Rashbam was indeed addressing Rashi. Their arguments are not convincing.
No less caustic is Rashbam's commentary to Genesis 45:28: “Israel said, ‘Enough! [Rav] My son Joseph is still alive. I must go and see him before I die.’” Rashi, following Targum Onkelos, interpreted the word rav to mean “much” or “great” and added the missing subject, while Rashbam interpreted it as “enough.” Rashbam also added the following comment: “Other interpretations of this text are contrived and foolish.” This caustic remark led some scholars to argue that it could not have been written by Rashbam but was the addition of a scribe. There is no persuasive argument for this suggestion.
In several places Rashbam uses a formula to refute Rashi, by first stating (without mentioning Rashi's name), “[and] he who interprets” (ve-ha-mefarsho or ha-mefaresh), then summarizing Rashi's commentary, sometimes only briefly, and finally sharply criticizing his interpretation.
"Second, insisting that people have to accept extraordinary and bizarre miracles in order to be good Jews is going to drive many people away from Judaism."
The exact opposite, it is kefira and disparagement of Emunah that drives people away from Judaism. Reform/Secularist "Judaism" is not Judaism. Midrashim like these are an absolutely vital part of Emunah, whether you take them literally or not, which is why Rashi brings them. We see the results of a society, a "Jewish" ideology that thinks like you, and we are repulsed.
Nobody here is defending the Reform movement. But to insist that midrashim be accepted as literal, which seems to be what is being demanded here, is contrary to our tradition as well. See Rabbi Avraham ben HaRambam.
You need not cite Avraham ben HaRambam. Rambam himself writes (Intro to Cheilek) about the foolishness of those who take Midrashim that were not meant to be taken literally as literal saying they are "imputing their own foolishness to Chazal" and making Chazal look ridiculous.
No, it is not contrary to our tradition. Many Rabbis accepted many Midrashim as literal. Chazal themselves accepted many of them as literal. Whether you want to accept this one specifically that way is besides the point. Slifkin is ridiculing the idea of miracles, and making the stupid claim that miracle stories in Chazal cause people to go OTD. It is the opposite, ridicule of miracles was one of the features of the Haskala, that led to mass abandonment of the Torah and continues to do so in the secularist community today.
Isn't it possible that the rabbis who accepted midrashim as literal were doing so because there was no reason to reject literalism when they were alive? And now, the religious right is stuck because calling this literalism into question is now seen as being influenced by secularism and rationalism, which are deemed heretical?
Take astrology. Are you saying that astrology is true? That it was true, but that it's no longer true?
This reminds me of the first Men in Black film, where Tommy Lee Jones went to the newsstand to look at the absurd National Enquirer stories for investigative leads, knowing that aliens are real and that it's just a very well kept secret from the public. Are you saying that when no one is looking, the roshei yeshiva ought to check out the horoscope pages of Cosmo and People Magazine?
I didn't mean that as a dig, even if it might have come across as one. I was just sharing a humorous thought that came to mind. Perhaps astrology is true and you need to have the skills to do it, and Cosmo and Redbook are a bunch of clowns. And I mean that seriously. But if we subject astrology to rigorous scrutiny, it will fall short every time. Every time. In essence, that's what it means when we say that astrology is bogus. It means it doesn't work.
But maybe this is insufficient for the believer in astrology. If they didn't arrive at their conclusion via evidence, and they don't value evidence, how can evidence be used to redirect them from their conclusion. There's also no evidence for tehillim lists, but you'd be hard pressed to find an Orthodox Jew who would say that tehillim lists are bogus. And yet there is no evidence for their efficacy.
So a puzzle. It's likely that Slifkin would argue against astrology but not against tehillim. So I hear your challenge, HGL.
Tehillim is simply a way of praying to God, which is of course one of the foundations of Judaism. Depending on what you mean by astrology, I can't say I stand behind it. I very much doubt the second to last line in your previous response, beginning "It's likely..."
I would teach it כפשוטו, like no doubt almost all rebbeim in actual Jewish schools do. It is a great lesson in Emunah and the ma'alos of a Tzadik. If a kid would ask if the stones really talked, I might say it is possible they did, but explain briefly that the Torah is very deep and there might be a different understanding. When the kids grow up and see many sources that allow such midrashim to be non-literal, they can still understand the lesson.
This is quite a complex perspective you have, HGL.
Schools do what they do, and we cannot change them. But for you to say the following is astounding:
1) It is possible that the stones argued among themselves
2) But there might be a different understanding
3) When you grow up, you will learn that 1+2 are not true, but that the message is still true
At first blush, it seems that #2 did not mean non-literal, or else you would have introduced that idea in #2 rather than wait for point #3, but perhaps you were being imprecise there.
I wonder why kids need to be taught things that are fantastical only to then be taught that these fantastical ideas might not be true. Isn't that like Santa Claus? All the adults do not believe in Santa Claus, while many children do. Many adults believe in talking stones, but why do they...because their rabbis told them to. Rabbi Schachter maintains that Adam and Eve are to be understood non-literally, and here you're arguing on midrashic stories, whereas those are biblical verses.
You seem to come here and berate Slifkin (and presumably most of the readers and commenters here) for being too liberal. Let's assume there's two ways to look at people: C1 and POV1
C1 = Credibility First
POV1 = Point of View First
Is there anyone you would accept prior to hearing their POV, or do you first need to hear their POV and then decide on their credibility. I imagine that most reasonable, modern people maintain a POV1 approach because that's what jibes with reasonable modernity. If you say stupid things, the reasonable person will reject your credibility. The idea that there's a mesorah at all, on the surface, seems to be one of C1. People are given credibility because of the mesorah, and then whatever they say is acceptable. Which sort of begs the question, because how did they get that mesorah-dik approbation? And is there anything they can say that will get them kicked out. Presumably it was because their views concord with the mesorah. And so it's a tough thing, it seems, to establish credibility. Take some big talmudic scholar like R' Schachter who says that Adam + Eve are not to be taken literally. Is that sufficient non-concordance with the mesorah for him to be canceled? Well, I suppose it matters who you ask. I find your tone, HGL, to be very dismissive.
Rashi lived like 1000 years ago. It was the age of belief and people hardly understood anything. I mean, literally...they didn't understand how the universe worked. And the Akivan approach to mystical interpretation was accepted by the majority because, from the way they saw it, what's the problem with making everything into a miracle? If you can have a miracle at all, one might argue, what's the difference between one miracle per generation vs 23 miracles every day?
The Ishmaelian approach, which minimizes miracles, and which was adopted by Saadia Gaon and Maimonides and Ralbag, among many others, was much more conservative. תָּפַסְתָּ מְרֻבֶּה, לֹא תָּפַסְתָּ. It's the Akivan approach that's being very liberal. So liberal, in fact, that it's perhaps too liberal. It's just that that's what was accepted back then, and locked in, so to speak, when Rashi was accepted as the go-to understanding, although times change. People are much less inclined to believe these things now. And the reason they don't believe is not because there are insufficient sources cited to back up the claims. It's because they not only don't think these things did happen, but that they couldn't have happened.
So what about miracles in general? Well, it's a good point that I'm making on your behalf here. If any miracle is claimed, then 23 miracles are just as likely, in some sense. And that's a problem that the rational believer seems to be confronted with, which itself is a very complex perspective.
Your comment is too long, too much to discuss here. You have clearly convinced yourself of many things. If you want to pick one or two things, we can discuss.
(Do you have a source that Rabbi Schachter said Adam + Eve are not literal? I doubt it, but if he did, it would drastically lower his credibility in my eyes.)
Sorry, I would need something more credible than that. Even he did say something like that, I would tend to doubt your interpretation if you are the only source.
** I would teach it כפשוטו, like no doubt almost all rebbeim in actual Jewish schools do.
Why would you do this, in light of your comments below?
** It is a great lesson in Emunah and the ma'alos of a Tzadik.
How, and please be precise here, is a fabicated story (see your comments below) inspiring?
** If a kid would ask if the stones really talked, I might say it is possible they did, but explain briefly that the Torah is very deep and there might be a different understanding.
In order to talk, they would have to understand. Otherwise, what are they talking about? What else did they understand? Did they also see? How did they know where they were relative to Jacob's head? Did they perceive him with vision or with electrical impulses or via sound waves? How did they receive and process these stimuli? Did they have minds? With memories? And how did they move? Did the stones become soft when they fused together? Why didn't Jacob's head fall into the stone(s). Did any grass become incorporated into the stones when they became soft? I wonder if you recognize the extent to which you need to change the way the universe works to assert that such a thing actually happened?
** When the kids grow up and see many sources that allow such midrashim to be non-literal, they can still understand the lesson.
I just don't see why you think it's a good idea to teach these stories to kids as historical and to adults as (possibly) non-historical.
2. Whether it was a real miracle or some type of allegory, the lesson is the same, and is very inspiring, as I explained below.
3. If it was a real miracle, then you are overthinking it. God did it however He did it. If you don't believe in God, or you don't think Him capable of performing such miracles, that's a separate discussion.
Explain my question? Guidance from my spiritual advisors is to see midrashim as ahistorical. I We (humans) tells kids fanciful stories that they don't question because they don't understand the universe, and this is common place. Christians have Santa Claus, and when Christian kids grow up, they are informed that it was completely made up and there's actually zero basis to think that such a thing occurs. Muslims have the story of Muhammed and a winged horse (as a non-Muslim, I'll admit that I'm not entirely clear what the various stories are) and when they grow up, they are not debriefed -- this is something they are told to continue believing.
Jews have both types of stories. We say that Eliyahu visits the circumcision and we say that Jonah was saved by some form of a large sea creature and also that the daughter of Pharaoh stretched out her hand and that rocks were arguing to get under Jacob's head. We are told that Jacob's eyes opened after he was dead during an argument at the Cave of the Patriarchs and that Naftali ran like the wind (or rather, like a nimble deer) faster than ordinarily possible and we are told that the Nile river turned to blood, and many other stories.
I wonder why we don't believe in Jesus' resurrection or that he was born of a virgin? Is it because we lack the mesorah or because we see such things as silly? When we are faced with great rabbis in high positions (such as R' Lord Jonathan Sacks and R' Hershel Schachter) saying that the story of Adam + Eve are not to be taken literally, the question is why? Sacks is on record, on video, discussing this with Dawkins, but he's dead now and so we probably can't gain clarity on this point. Why did he say that we can look to these stories as ahistorical myths? As you said here and above, either directly or by implication, if we can accept any miracle, then we can accept many miracles. And if we cannot accept Adam + Eve, then why can't we? If it's because it's a silly story, then why can't we reject anything and everything based on a scale of silliness, rather than having to fall back on a claim of tradition. It seems to me that no authorities in the religious tradition explained any fanciful texts as ahistorical until such time as it became untenable to do so in light of greater understanding of the universe.
This is, as explained by Neil deGrasse Tyson, similar to the ever receding God of the Gaps. Doctors of religion had no problem understanding things as they were written until such time as they could no longer get away with it and still be taken seriously. You, HGL, seem to be able to extend your credulity more than most.
In this regard, I find partial rationalism as the most difficult position to take. Lawrence Kelemen railed against atheism, but I think he missed the point because as I see it, all the staunch and strident atheists are just being firm in their rejection of poor evidence as they see it. They are not strident in saying there is no god -- rather, they are strident that there's no good evidence. They are as firm in their atheism as they are in their a-fairy-ism. Ben Shapiro said that if NdGT is to be accepted in his claim of agnosticism, then many religious people also fall into that category. NdGT would agree, and respond that, indeed, everyone is necessarily an agnostic, even if they don't know it.
And by reading and hearing R' Sacks, it certainly seems like he's in agreement with this.
If we don't believe in Jesus's resurrection, it's NOT because we prima facie see miracles stories as silly. As Jews, we do believe in resurrection.
I can't answer for Rabbi Sacks, and see no reason to. He is completely misguided, plain and simple. Do you feel the need to answer for all rabbis, including hassidic rabbis, who say things you feel are completely misguided?
Secular people are just as credulous as anybody else, and believe all sorts of ridiculous things, like that men are sometimes really women when they feel like it, and will give all sorts of justifications for their ridiculous beliefs.
Atheists have a belief system just as much as religious people, but are less honest in admitting it. A belief that there is no evidence of God is as much of a belief as anything else.
Well, I think the main part is the lesson. And the main lesson is עלי יניח הצדיק את ראשו. That even the stones of the field wanted to serve Yaakov Avinu. But of course it is much deeper than that, we can ask why this lesson is taught here specifically, and in this way? What else can we learn from this? That interests me more than if the stones really talked (and unlike other places, a miracle doesn't necessarily seem to be the main point here. But I could be wrong.)
What does it mean to you, HGL, that to teach lessons we need to make up stories? Because if you said above that these can be understood non-literally, but that the message is still true, then is it just a tool to train children?
It's like taking a group one wants to be bigoted against (Jews, blacks, minorities, homosexuals, etc) and telling a story where they are the villain, and deriving the moral of the story as "see, the ________ is bad because look at what they did" or "look what happened to them." But then upon further scrutiny, you admit that the story is made up, but the lesson is true.
To me, we should derive lessons from data, not from anecdotes. The plural of anecdotes isn't evidence. But even putting that aside, let's say anecdotes were good evidence. If when pressured, you admit that the anecdote is false but that you still want to learn the lesson, where are you learning that lesson from? Doesn't it now become transparent that the lesson was what you started with, and that it wasn't an outcome of anything other than bigotry?
We see references made to both ancient Egypt and Sodom, that homosexuality was practiced. As though homosexuality is the proof that theses places were bad, steeped in immorality. But is that what you really think? Is that what anyone really thinks, other than being told to think that by their religion? I would think that this would mean you could detect immorality in a person even if you didn't know that they were homosexuals -- because what else would it mean to say that they are immoral? I wonder. There are many people today who are gay and yet you'd never know if if they didn't say anything. To me, it seems that the claim of homosexuality being prevalent in ancient Egypt and Sodom were more claims of how bad the places were, but I don't know...I wasn't there.
"To me, we should derive lessons from data, not from anecdotes."
"Doesn't it now become transparent that the lesson was what you started with, and that it wasn't an outcome of anything other than bigotry?"
Using this logic, we should rid ourselves of the entire corpus of human literature, and just have a list of a couple hundred lessons in its place. Narratives are vastly important in impressing upon us, and shaping our thought.
Which ones? But you raise a good point. Why does Rashi never bring Midrash Rabboh in Bamidbor or Devorim? The answer is those midroshim were authoured completely differently from Midrash Rabboh on Bereishis. Despite the same name.
Why were they authored differently? Did Wellhausen analyze the styles and find discrepancies? Why couldn't some works of an author survive and others get lost? That happened countless times.
But Maharitz Chajes in his introduction to Midrash points out that Rashi never cites Shemos Raba.
I think that the (genuine) Yerushalmi on Kodoshim (mentioned by Rambam) had the same author(s) as the other sections of the Yerushalmi did, only they survived and it didn't.
Being repulsed is not unique to Jews. The most extreme adherents to any belief system are repulsed by those who don't share their belief system. It doesn't make you Jewish - it makes you an extremist. It doesn't make the object of your revulsion bad, you understand. It's a phobia, really.
Oh, I know it's not unique to Jews. It's not even unique to religion, most secular modern people would be proud to say they are repulsed by racism. Is that also too extremist for you?
But what constitutes "racism?" For an average person, not overly brainwashed, there is a commitment to equal rights.
For an extremist - racism is in every nook and cranny of human existence. They are committed to "fighting" it.
I've been both people. I realized at some point that extremism said more about my own hidden needs, my own hurts, my own issues - than anything else.
I think we all see, for instance, the manichean notion of hurling homosexuals off buildings in Iran (for religious reasons) as saying a bit more about the hurlers than the hurled.
Part of the Enlightenment was to shine a light on this aspect of human nature. Part of religion (and all movements) is to shut off that light.
You are aware that the Mesillas Yesharim at the beginning of the book brings this Midrash to prove that the world serves the tzadikim. This lesson is what I believe Rav Aharon Feldman finds crucial.
Overwhelmingly, children raised on miraculous stories have no problem with them PROVIDED that they aren't later confronted with a skeptical environment, whether from parents, school, or an intense relationship with secular society. There are circles in which being afraid like this for the future is just crying "wolf". We need to help everyone, and for those exposed to skepticism it's sometimes necessary to de-miracle-ize stories, where authorities allow.
"Peshuto Shel Mikra, a very popular five-volume work which offers... traditional interpretations WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THE PLAIN MEANING of Scripture."
I am I the only one who is picking up on the outright kefira insinuated in this sentence?? The message seems quite loud that even the simple interpretations offered by the Rishonim are not really the 'real' interpretation. Just 'close' to the 'plain meaning'. But the plain meaning is how Kugel understands it. Or the Sadducees. Or the Karaites. But not the 'traditional interpretations'.
What about how the Rashbam understands its? Ibn Ezra? Targum? All much more 'close to the plain meaning of scripture' than midrash. Is that kefirah? What about chassidishe torah - far far away from the even the simple interperatations offered by the Rishonim. Acceptable? Are non-rishonim even permitted to interpret scripture according to you? If not, you will need to empty your bookshelf. Rav Hirsch made a point of deliberately explaining pesukim without rishonim, being mechadesh peshat himself based on his knowledge of nach. Acceptable? Where do you draw the line? If the acharonim can interpret scripture. can Rabbi Lord Dr Sacks? You must be aware that in nach, the rishonim and acahronim frequently and deliberately interpret pesukim differently from the gemorroh. Radak does it the whole time. Acceptable?
Uh hello? Anybody home? The Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and Radak etc. are PRECISELY the 'traditional interpretations' that the Peshuto Shel Mikra chumash draws from! Yet according to Natan, they are only CLOSE to the plain meaning of Scripture, but not the plain meaning itself!
Not sure what's so complicated here! I just quoted Natan's sentence and showed how he is implying that the 'traditional interpretations' are 'close' to the plain meaning, but it seems that he feels that they are not the meaning itself. I never said a word about Onkelos.
You wrote: “traditional interpretations WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THE PLAIN MEANING of Scripture."
I am I [sic] the only one who is picking up on the outright kefira insinuated in this sentence?? The message seems quite loud that even the simple interpretations offered by the Rishonim are not really the 'real' interpretation. Just 'close' to the 'plain meaning'. ”
I think you might be reading too deeply in to what RNS said in that sentence you quoted and took umbrage with.
By “Plain meaning” RNS might just mean the simple straightforward explanation ala Occam’s razor. The simple meaning requiring the least gymnastics.
In that sentence you quoted, RNS might not be making a Judgment call as to “real meaning” at all.
The possuk states: וַיִּקַּח֙ מֵאַבְנֵ֣י הַמָּקֹ֔ום
Sefaria translates that as “Taking one of the stones of that place.”
To me that is a poor translation; it seems like the translation should be: “He took [something not explicitly stated] from the stones of that place.”
What is that unstated thing? since the thing is unstated:
a) it might be one stone,
b) it might be multiple stones.
The midrash in question argues on Sefaria and says that it was multiple stones (based on the word “Avnei” (stones) even though the actual word in the possuk was “m’avnei” (from the stones)) and looks at the later possuk which says: וַיִּקַּ֤ח אֶת־הָאֶ֙בֶן֙ and concludes that now the “Even” is stone (singular) so there must have been a miracle.
Where as occam’s razor might say the second possuk which says “the stone” (singular) simply clarified what the unstated thing that was originally “taken from the stones” had been. Thus it had always been one stone that he went to sleep on and woke up on. (The plain meaning)
This would not be a statement by RNS as to which meaning is “Real” just which is “plain”
It looks to me like you somewhat misrepresent what he is saying. You say "First is that they dethrone Rashi as being the sole legitimate peshat." While he does say that his first issue is that the book argues with Rashi on what is "peshuto shel mikra", he clearly does not mean this in the sense of what is a legitimate peshat, but what is the 'basic' peshat, i.e. the default position. You are (seemingly) using peshat in the colloquial sense of "an interpretation" (e.g. "here's a nice peshat") whereas he is using it in the more specific sense of "the basic interpretation" (e.g. "zeh peshuto..."). He clearly says he is happy for the other peshat to be quoted as a "yesh omrim", i.e. he says it is fine to learn it, just that "the mesorah" says that Rashi is the basic peshat.
To me this is quite a big difference. It means that where you say "it is absolutely crucial to Judaism to teach that there were sentient stones arguing and jostling about which one should move to the desired position." he is insisting that this be taught as the basic peshat in the pasuk, but not that you can't also say "some people say that it actually means...".
(Personally I disagree, it is hard to argue that this case of the story of the stones is anything but a medrashic enterpretation. The pasuk doesn't say or really allude to it at all. But that's tangential to my point that he is clearly not claiming it as the sole peshat but the basic peshat.)
Dr, is it crucial to Judaism that the Creator of the universe appeared upon a mountain and spoke to an entire nation of people? Is it crucial to believe that all of the water in the land of Egypt turned to blood, or that a staff turned into a snake? Your ridicule of the necessity of believing in so-called sentient stones is concerning and consequential to many cores of our faith.
There's a story about a Chassidic Rebbe (I believe it was about Rabbi Nachum of Chernobyl, who was a heavy-set man) who sat down in a wicker chair. The wicker chair wasn't able to bear his weight, and it tore, with the Rebbe falling through the webbing of the chair.
He mused: "It seems I'm a tzaddik as great as Ya'akov Avinu! When I sat on the chair, the holes in the seat started to argue: each one wanted that I should sit on it! So, they all decided to become one big hole, and I fell through!"
I wish I knew where to find all of these “letters and pamphlets” as the topic of peshat and drash is one that is very interesting for me.
I find this whole controversy to be very disturbing. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding on the definition of “peshat” and the nature of Rashi’s commentary on the Torah. The scholarly studies on these topics are vast with probably hundreds of academic articles written on them. Generally, “peshat” or “peshto shel mikrah” as understood by the Rishonim and later commentators is understood to be the plain meaning of the text, taking into account elements such as grammar, syntax, and most importantly context. Rashi’s commentary is often assumed to be a peshat commentary, but this idea should be surprising to anyone familiar with it as it consists of about 2/3 midrashic material. This misunderstanding is based on a partial reading of Rashi’s programmatic statement that he makes on Beraishis 3:8 – “אני לא באתי אלא לפשוטו של מקרא ולאגדה המתישבת דברי המקרא”. For some reason people only see the first half of this statement and think that Rashi is only coming to explain peshat. But he is actually saying that he is doing two things: peshat and midrashim. Many of Rashi’s comments include both aspects, for example, in parshas Shemos “ותשלח את אמתה”. Most school children know the midrash that Rashi quotes from the Talmud that Paroh’s daughter’s arm miraculously extended, but Rashi also states a peshat comment that אמתה refers to her maidservant. From the many examples where Rashi contrasts peshat and derash we can see the difference between them. In the example of the rocks arguing it is clear that Rashi himself would consider this one of his midrashic interpretations. So for someone to argue that we must accept Rashi’s comment as peshat is quite bizarre.
Incidentally, the chumash פשוטו של מקרא is not an exclusively peshat oriented work. Several of its interpretations are midrashic, for example, that the servant Avraham sent to find a wife for Yitzchak was Eliezer and that when the Torah describes Yaakov as a “dweller of tents” it means he was learning torah. So I don’t understand the fervent opposition to this chumash as it seems the authors are not staunchly ideological peshatists, but rather suggest peshat interpretations where Rashi quotes midrashic ones. It should be no more controversial than the Rashbam’s commentary.
Rashi is an encyclopidic commentary. You gain a vast knowledge from it. It has all aspects of Rabbinic exegesis.
You wonder if R. Feldman actually believes that the world was supernatural long ago, or if he "believes that he believes it, even if he doesn’t actually believe it." Myself, I wonder the same thing about your claim that your personal issues caused "hundreds and possibly thousands of people [to leave] the charedi world". I would have spat out my drink in laugher, had I been drinking when I read it. Do you actually believe yourself so important, or do you merely believe you believe it, even if you don't actually believe it?
It has nothing to do with my being important, it's about the Gedolim revealing themselves to be so anti-science and rational thought. I was contacted by many, many people who told me that they left the charedi world as a result. Some moved into YU-type circles, others left Orthodox altogether.
The STORC/RNS ban was a historic tragedy, and I already know not through you of people who were lost to Judaism through it to various degrees. But one thing fascinates me, how far did they move? Did anyone move from all the way from Meah Shearim to Dizengof? I think not. From NIRC to YU, or from YU to YCT, or from YCT to JTS, or from JTS to HUC—I don't know all these places from up close—sounds more likely. Or someone on the way to becoming a Baal Teshuva, not yet anchored, and the ban exploded in their face. What is the furthest anyone moved? Had they been deeply ensconced in their strata, at the fringe, or in between?
(I'm also wondering if lately you've had less time to compose your posts and monitor the comments. There's been something different about them recently, not sure exactly what.)
Thanks and cheers!
R' Feldman said a fundamental of Judaism is that miracles were commonplace for the Avos. In your paraphrase that somehow gets twisted into a totally different statement, that a fundamental of Judaism is that stones are sentient. These are two very different ideas. I'm surprised to see you grossly misrepresent what R' Feldman said. Whether open miracles were in fact commonplace for the Avos can legitimately be questioned, but there's no need to distort R' Feldman's position.
On a related note, I'm not sure why you think it is specifically a Charedi maximalist view of miracles that drives people away from Judaism. You mock "extraordinary and bizarre miracles", but fundamentally we frum Jews accept extraordinary miracles. In a sense, the rest of the discussion is simply details around how often and for whom miracles occur. For someone struggling with Orthodox Judaism in the modern world and wondering where there is room for miracles in an orderly, scientific universe, does it really matter whether he is being asked to accept the Charedi view that stones talked or the more modest view you propose where you "only" have to accept ten plagues, the sea splitting, and food miraculously provided in the middle of the desert six days a week for forty years? Somehow I don't think so.
1. He says that it is crucial to teach that these stones were sentient. I wrote that I don't know whether he believes this to be true of stones in general. On further reflection, he likely means that it was specifically these stones that miraculously became sentient.
2. Yes, fundamentally Judaism accepts miracles. However, (A) they are usually naturalized to a lesser or greater degree - including the plagues, the splitting of the sea, and even the manna; and (B) these are miracles that are highlighted in the Torah as being of tremendous national importance, not weird stories about sentient stones which isn't even explicitly mentioned.
1. Sorry, where do you see that? He says "From the commentary it emerges that the Avos were not accustomed to miracles (the stones did not say about Jacob "may the righteous one's head rest upon me", and his journey was not miraculously shortened)". He's saying it is important to teach that the Avos were accustomed to miracles, and cites two examples of such miracles brought by Rashi and omitted by the commentary. The important point is not the stories themselves, but what they illustrate about the Avos. He is clearly not saying that the stories in isolation are fundamental to Judaism.
2. Fair point. Still, I think the conflicts between the modern Western world and religion are fundamental conflicts. The distance between Charedi beliefs and say Modern Orthodox beliefs is much less than the distance between a religious and secular worldview. And for people living in the Western world, the questions that arise from the conflict between religion and secularism come up regardless of whether you believe in the literalness of any particular midrash. I know people who have given up their faith who were educated with and without these Charedi beliefs. I just don't think it makes a difference.
1. Do you not know how to read?? He explicitly says nisim. But I already know of your reading abilities from your discussion with Mecharker regarding the Tashbetz 😂
2A. You can "naturalize" this miracle too, if it happened, no less than the Plagues and the Splitting of the Sea.
2B. What is the logic here? Miracles can only happen if they reach some arbitrary degree of importance decided by yourself? Because in your uninformed opinion, this miracle wouldn't have had enough significance and is just "weird"?? And why is the fact that it isn't explicitly mentioned important, do you believe in Torah She'baal Peh? And do you believe in miracles that ARE explicitly mentioned, like the Mabul?
1. He explicitly mentions the stones story.
2A. No you can't.
2B. It's about whether they make sense theologically and whether the Torah wants us to believe that they happened.
1. And he explicitly mentions nissim, read it.
2A. Obviously you can, and more easily.
2B. You are in no position to make theological sense of anything.
@Rav Slifkin
@HappyGoLucky
2A. No you can't.
2A. Obviously you can, and more easily.
LOL! More unfalsifiable flummery.
Another example of folks with too much time on their hands. Find something more productive to accomplish, like arguing about how many malochim might be able to dance on the head of a pin.
When I see religious doctrinal debates engaging in unfalsifiable
delusional mythology, it wonders me in the least why so many Jews have gone OTD. Or decided never to have entered The Derech in the first place.
@Slifkin- 2A. No you can't.
@HappyGoLucky- 2A. Obviously you can, and more easily.
@Uriah’s Wife- [dumb rambling atheist jargon from the early 2000s]
I think all religious people who are serious about their religion accept irrational ideas (like miracles.) But, it's for one reason, above all others: it insulates the person from being argued out of belief.
I can argue with a person that the historical stories of the origins of his religion are tenuous, and not well supported by any historical methodology or findings. I can argue that his own commitment to the story of the genesis of his religion is not rooted in logic, but in emotion. But, if he crosses the divide and simply accepts the irrational, he nullifies the idea of arguing, completely. He insulates himself from that part of his mind that thinks, and embraces that part of his mind that has desires, needs, fears, and love for his religion.
This acceptance of miracles is the perfect element in every religion - because it isn't subject to any kind of objective analysis.
From a rational point of view, it is incredibly childish - but equally incredibly powerful and enjoyable.
It's the child grabbing the shiny toy of his friend in the playpen, calling it his own, and playing with it selfishly. It's the same child tossing the toy aside, calling it his friend's again, when it breaks, or requires putting away. It’s having it both ways, and not apologizing for it - like small children are known to do.
It's why so many "sane" people - in order to keep their sanity and sense of real fairness and aversion to solipsism - back away from religion.
And it is equally why every religion INSISTS on having miracles, and irrational, unreasoned, elements -- these qualities are impervious, beyond argument, delicious, fun, and powerful.
To go back to the child in us – believing in miracles makes you the kid two grades above, trouncing all the kids around him in basketball, and loving every delicious moment of being the "best player in the world."
To believe in the miracles of your religion is to feel the ultimate truth of your life, above the lives of all others.
To “snap out” of this irrational belief, is to take the same kid, and watch him now cry as he is mercilessly crushed by kids two grades above him. It is the same as when one comes to doubt his own religion. There can be a lot of pain to taking on the job of thinking, and not simply believing in the salve of the irrational. (Maybe that’s why people in great pain sometimes turn to religion, or “discover” G-d.)
The rational moment is quite the downer. Much more fun to be the miracle player crushing all competition and feeling quite powerful! Which would any of us rather be? How would any of us rather feel? Believing in miracles can make us downright giddy. Why would we all enjoy a good hashgacha pratis story, otherwise?
Of course, the whole idea of becoming a grown up is to deal with reality a little bit better than we did as children. But, it's sort of no fun to think too much. Back to the miracles, the religious community, the “heads I win, tails you lose” way of enjoying life. I remember it fondly.
(I do wish I could be alive for the end of the millennia. I understand moshiach is to arrive by then. I know what will happen: the rabbis will reinterpret as the date draws near. When moshiach does not arrive, the new interpretation (“it’s a thousand more years, dummy!”) will supplant the old one. The show must go on, as they say.)
Now, if moshiach does one day arrive, that would be fun, too.
I was searching for information about the Sadkhin Complex last week and one of the top google search results was the Imamother website. While one is generally restricted from searching within the website unless one is a member, unrestricted pages are apparently viewable by the google bot.
Anyway, the Sadkhin Complex is a pseudoscientific method of weight loss / control that combines, according to their own terminology, "restrictive dieting and acupuncture techniques." According to someone assessing this method from a scientific perspective, the pejorative "starving and bull$h*t" terminology is preferred. And this was basically the debate that raged on the Imamother discussion board. One woman was telling a story about how her aunt or her cousin or her neighbor had used this method successfully, while another woman replied that anecdotes don't suffice as evidence and that of course if you starve yourself you'll lose weight, regardless of which pressure points you engage, or if you rub your eyes or pick your nose, etc. Someone attacked this method of weight loss because as soon as you reach your target weight and discontinue the diet, you gain the weight back, to which another replied that that's not a sufficient slam on this diet because that's how all diets work -- you need to actually adopt a new lifestyle of eating and balance that with exercise. If you think you'll just eat this or that at this time of day, then that's not how you maintain or lose weight in a sustainable manner.
It seemed that there was a real discussion there relating to how to evaluate what works, how it works (if it does, indeed, work), how we know it works and so forth and so on. And then you scrolled down and there was an unrelated post offering to put your name on a tehillim list, and I thought that the contrast was intriguing.
@Torrey, you don't need an answer. You need a hug.
logical fallacy known as ad hominem, used effectively by cult groomers. Nice to have something to fall back on, if whatever you do now doesn't work out...
I was trying to be nice, not presumptuous.
Be well.
"If you get offended, he says he was just trying to be nice." - from website: Learn to Recognize 26 Covert Abuse Tactics.
You're a natural..!
If I'm blunt you win, if I'm nice I lose. As I have no credibility, check with a third party or the mirror if your comments were just as ad hominem as mine, just longer and more thorough, and more unambiguously negative.
-Don the abuser.
The midrash upon which Rashi is based is reading the pesukim carefully. Pasuk 11 says ויקח מאבני המקום, while Pasuk 18 says ויקח את האבן. The midrash also presumes that מאבני ("from the rocks") means Yaakov took more than one. (This is where - without seeing the sefer - I assume there is a difference of opinion as to what is פשוטו של מקרא.) If that's the case, then he started with many rocks and ended up with one. *That* is where the midrash then explains how many rocks turned into one rock. (The opposite is the case with the midrash about hitting one צפרדע and it becoming multiple צפרדעים.)
Once the pesukim say what they do, the midrash then looks to teach us something about Yaakov based on the many rocks to one rock.
If I recall, the Gur Aryeh explains the stones fighting at length, and ridicules people who think in terms of this post.
The Maharal states that Vashti could not possibly have grown a tale. It means she put on weight. Because if she really grew a tail, that would be a neis niglah, and purim was a neis nistar.
There are other instances in Chazal of inanimate things "speaking".
For example, there is the story of the repentance of Rabbi Elazar Ben Durdaya (Avodah Zarah 17a). He asks from the mountains to intercede for him and ask for mercy from Heaven to forgive his sins. He then turns to Heaven and Earth to intercede, the sun and the moon, the stars and the constellations. When they all respond with a verse saying that they are also transient and can't help him, he weeps out of sincere repentance, until he passes away. A Heavenly Voice announces that he has merited Olam HaBa.
(I think the same conversation appears with Moshe in Midrash Rabba, Parshat Vaetchanan, where he prays to enter Eretz Yisrael and is refused.)
A much more popular one might be the moon complainingאִ"אֶ לִשְׁנֵי מְלָכִים שֶׁיִשְׁתַּמְּשׁוּ בְכֶתֶר אֶחָד and then a solution to that being עַל יְדֵי שֶׁמִּעֵט אֶת הַלְּבָנָה הִרְבָּה צְבָאָיהָ לְהָפִיס דַּעְתָּהּ.
It's tough to say exactly what people at the time of Rashi knew and didn't know, but Giordano Bruno seems to have been the first, or one of the first, to propose that stars were distant suns. Quora seems to turn it around, explaining that the breakthrough was rather to realize that our sun was merely a very close star. I'm not astronomically informed enough to appreciate the real difference here.
Abraham Joshua Heschel's Heavenly Torah explains quite nicely how the Akivan and Ishmaelian routes of explanation form a thread throughout the Talmud on mystical and rationalist sides of the story. I sent R' Jeremy Wieder an email asking him if what he thought about this perspective and he said that he is unsure of the validity of such an approach. (So I have documentation, in case someone is writing a Wikipedia article.) But the book was very helpful is explaining the two sides...a predecessor, let's call it, of R' Slifkin's most recent work.
R' Ishmael, he explains, says that these things were never meant to be taken literally and were just stories introduced to cater to the unintelligent masses. It's difficult to see, from Heschel's perspective, whether R' Akiva thought the same thing, but was the one catering to the masses, or if he actually believed them. I wonder about the view that maintains these Kiplingesque explanations as actual historical documentation.
According to Rabbi Feldman, does this mean that before Rashi wrote his commentary, no one was allowed to learn Chumash?
Are they also aware that the Rashbam criticized Rashi for being overly Midrashic, and that Rashi eventually agreed?
Read that Rashbam again (Bereishis 37,2)
He says Rashi agreed he should have ADDED more pshat, but he himself agrees the midrash is more important.
For more on Rashbam's opinion of Rashi's commentary to Chumash, see his peirush to Shemos 40:35. For more on his attitude toward midreshei Chazal, see his peirush to Vayikra 13:2.
The translator of Artscroll Rashi!!
Thanks, I wasn't aware of these.
Yes, because of the lessons contained therein, NOT because it's pshat.
The Rashbam harshly criticizes Rashi for presenting drash as pshat:
"The polemic with Rashi is reflected in another surprising way: in several places Rashbam attacked Rashi's commentary in sharp, scathing language, and even though he did not mention Rashi by name, there is no doubt that the Rashbam's readers knew very well to whom he was referring. Such is the case in the commentary on Genesis 49:9: “Judah is a lion's whelp; from the prey, my son [mi-teref beni], you have gone up. He crouches down, he stretches out like a lion, like a lioness—who dares rouse him up?” Rashi, following Bereshit Rabbah, understood Jacob's words to Judah to be the attack on Joseph, while Rashbam assumed that they referred to a prophecy about the future. Rashbam added the following comment: “Whoever explains this phrase as referring to the sale of Joseph has no understanding of either the context of the verse or the punctuation of the cantillation signs.” The sharpness of this comment has led several scholars to doubt that Rashbam was indeed addressing Rashi. Their arguments are not convincing.
No less caustic is Rashbam's commentary to Genesis 45:28: “Israel said, ‘Enough! [Rav] My son Joseph is still alive. I must go and see him before I die.’” Rashi, following Targum Onkelos, interpreted the word rav to mean “much” or “great” and added the missing subject, while Rashbam interpreted it as “enough.” Rashbam also added the following comment: “Other interpretations of this text are contrived and foolish.” This caustic remark led some scholars to argue that it could not have been written by Rashbam but was the addition of a scribe. There is no persuasive argument for this suggestion.
In several places Rashbam uses a formula to refute Rashi, by first stating (without mentioning Rashi's name), “[and] he who interprets” (ve-ha-mefarsho or ha-mefaresh), then summarizing Rashi's commentary, sometimes only briefly, and finally sharply criticizing his interpretation.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ajs-review/article/anxiety-of-influence-rashbams-approach-to-rashis-commentary-on-the-torah/87C2C6F18AD0222BD11D096465DD5815
Uh... Did I write otherwise?
"Second, insisting that people have to accept extraordinary and bizarre miracles in order to be good Jews is going to drive many people away from Judaism."
The exact opposite, it is kefira and disparagement of Emunah that drives people away from Judaism. Reform/Secularist "Judaism" is not Judaism. Midrashim like these are an absolutely vital part of Emunah, whether you take them literally or not, which is why Rashi brings them. We see the results of a society, a "Jewish" ideology that thinks like you, and we are repulsed.
Nobody here is defending the Reform movement. But to insist that midrashim be accepted as literal, which seems to be what is being demanded here, is contrary to our tradition as well. See Rabbi Avraham ben HaRambam.
You need not cite Avraham ben HaRambam. Rambam himself writes (Intro to Cheilek) about the foolishness of those who take Midrashim that were not meant to be taken literally as literal saying they are "imputing their own foolishness to Chazal" and making Chazal look ridiculous.
What do other authorities say?
No, it is not contrary to our tradition. Many Rabbis accepted many Midrashim as literal. Chazal themselves accepted many of them as literal. Whether you want to accept this one specifically that way is besides the point. Slifkin is ridiculing the idea of miracles, and making the stupid claim that miracle stories in Chazal cause people to go OTD. It is the opposite, ridicule of miracles was one of the features of the Haskala, that led to mass abandonment of the Torah and continues to do so in the secularist community today.
Isn't it possible that the rabbis who accepted midrashim as literal were doing so because there was no reason to reject literalism when they were alive? And now, the religious right is stuck because calling this literalism into question is now seen as being influenced by secularism and rationalism, which are deemed heretical?
Take astrology. Are you saying that astrology is true? That it was true, but that it's no longer true?
This reminds me of the first Men in Black film, where Tommy Lee Jones went to the newsstand to look at the absurd National Enquirer stories for investigative leads, knowing that aliens are real and that it's just a very well kept secret from the public. Are you saying that when no one is looking, the roshei yeshiva ought to check out the horoscope pages of Cosmo and People Magazine?
I didn't mean that as a dig, even if it might have come across as one. I was just sharing a humorous thought that came to mind. Perhaps astrology is true and you need to have the skills to do it, and Cosmo and Redbook are a bunch of clowns. And I mean that seriously. But if we subject astrology to rigorous scrutiny, it will fall short every time. Every time. In essence, that's what it means when we say that astrology is bogus. It means it doesn't work.
But maybe this is insufficient for the believer in astrology. If they didn't arrive at their conclusion via evidence, and they don't value evidence, how can evidence be used to redirect them from their conclusion. There's also no evidence for tehillim lists, but you'd be hard pressed to find an Orthodox Jew who would say that tehillim lists are bogus. And yet there is no evidence for their efficacy.
So a puzzle. It's likely that Slifkin would argue against astrology but not against tehillim. So I hear your challenge, HGL.
""
Do you stand behind astrology?
Do you stand behind tehillim?
Interestingly, there might be more of a מסורה for the former than the latter.
Tehillim is simply a way of praying to God, which is of course one of the foundations of Judaism. Depending on what you mean by astrology, I can't say I stand behind it. I very much doubt the second to last line in your previous response, beginning "It's likely..."
(Are you new to this blog?)
Happy, how do you understand this midrash? How would you teach this Rashi to students?
I would teach it כפשוטו, like no doubt almost all rebbeim in actual Jewish schools do. It is a great lesson in Emunah and the ma'alos of a Tzadik. If a kid would ask if the stones really talked, I might say it is possible they did, but explain briefly that the Torah is very deep and there might be a different understanding. When the kids grow up and see many sources that allow such midrashim to be non-literal, they can still understand the lesson.
This is quite a complex perspective you have, HGL.
Schools do what they do, and we cannot change them. But for you to say the following is astounding:
1) It is possible that the stones argued among themselves
2) But there might be a different understanding
3) When you grow up, you will learn that 1+2 are not true, but that the message is still true
At first blush, it seems that #2 did not mean non-literal, or else you would have introduced that idea in #2 rather than wait for point #3, but perhaps you were being imprecise there.
I wonder why kids need to be taught things that are fantastical only to then be taught that these fantastical ideas might not be true. Isn't that like Santa Claus? All the adults do not believe in Santa Claus, while many children do. Many adults believe in talking stones, but why do they...because their rabbis told them to. Rabbi Schachter maintains that Adam and Eve are to be understood non-literally, and here you're arguing on midrashic stories, whereas those are biblical verses.
You seem to come here and berate Slifkin (and presumably most of the readers and commenters here) for being too liberal. Let's assume there's two ways to look at people: C1 and POV1
C1 = Credibility First
POV1 = Point of View First
Is there anyone you would accept prior to hearing their POV, or do you first need to hear their POV and then decide on their credibility. I imagine that most reasonable, modern people maintain a POV1 approach because that's what jibes with reasonable modernity. If you say stupid things, the reasonable person will reject your credibility. The idea that there's a mesorah at all, on the surface, seems to be one of C1. People are given credibility because of the mesorah, and then whatever they say is acceptable. Which sort of begs the question, because how did they get that mesorah-dik approbation? And is there anything they can say that will get them kicked out. Presumably it was because their views concord with the mesorah. And so it's a tough thing, it seems, to establish credibility. Take some big talmudic scholar like R' Schachter who says that Adam + Eve are not to be taken literally. Is that sufficient non-concordance with the mesorah for him to be canceled? Well, I suppose it matters who you ask. I find your tone, HGL, to be very dismissive.
Rashi lived like 1000 years ago. It was the age of belief and people hardly understood anything. I mean, literally...they didn't understand how the universe worked. And the Akivan approach to mystical interpretation was accepted by the majority because, from the way they saw it, what's the problem with making everything into a miracle? If you can have a miracle at all, one might argue, what's the difference between one miracle per generation vs 23 miracles every day?
The Ishmaelian approach, which minimizes miracles, and which was adopted by Saadia Gaon and Maimonides and Ralbag, among many others, was much more conservative. תָּפַסְתָּ מְרֻבֶּה, לֹא תָּפַסְתָּ. It's the Akivan approach that's being very liberal. So liberal, in fact, that it's perhaps too liberal. It's just that that's what was accepted back then, and locked in, so to speak, when Rashi was accepted as the go-to understanding, although times change. People are much less inclined to believe these things now. And the reason they don't believe is not because there are insufficient sources cited to back up the claims. It's because they not only don't think these things did happen, but that they couldn't have happened.
So what about miracles in general? Well, it's a good point that I'm making on your behalf here. If any miracle is claimed, then 23 miracles are just as likely, in some sense. And that's a problem that the rational believer seems to be confronted with, which itself is a very complex perspective.
Your comment is too long, too much to discuss here. You have clearly convinced yourself of many things. If you want to pick one or two things, we can discuss.
(Do you have a source that Rabbi Schachter said Adam + Eve are not literal? I doubt it, but if he did, it would drastically lower his credibility in my eyes.)
@Happy, you may not accept that regarding RHS, except as allowed by the laws of LH"R, such as knowing so directly.
I asked him myself in person and that's what he replied. We had a conversation in the main beis medrash for about an hour.
Source: Me.
Sorry, I would need something more credible than that. Even he did say something like that, I would tend to doubt your interpretation if you are the only source.
** I would teach it כפשוטו, like no doubt almost all rebbeim in actual Jewish schools do.
Why would you do this, in light of your comments below?
** It is a great lesson in Emunah and the ma'alos of a Tzadik.
How, and please be precise here, is a fabicated story (see your comments below) inspiring?
** If a kid would ask if the stones really talked, I might say it is possible they did, but explain briefly that the Torah is very deep and there might be a different understanding.
In order to talk, they would have to understand. Otherwise, what are they talking about? What else did they understand? Did they also see? How did they know where they were relative to Jacob's head? Did they perceive him with vision or with electrical impulses or via sound waves? How did they receive and process these stimuli? Did they have minds? With memories? And how did they move? Did the stones become soft when they fused together? Why didn't Jacob's head fall into the stone(s). Did any grass become incorporated into the stones when they became soft? I wonder if you recognize the extent to which you need to change the way the universe works to assert that such a thing actually happened?
** When the kids grow up and see many sources that allow such midrashim to be non-literal, they can still understand the lesson.
I just don't see why you think it's a good idea to teach these stories to kids as historical and to adults as (possibly) non-historical.
"How, and please be precise here, is a fabicated story (see your comments below) inspiring?"
Like the story of 'the boy who cried wolf''. Do you think it really happened? Do you think Aesops fables really happened?
1. Explain.
2. Whether it was a real miracle or some type of allegory, the lesson is the same, and is very inspiring, as I explained below.
3. If it was a real miracle, then you are overthinking it. God did it however He did it. If you don't believe in God, or you don't think Him capable of performing such miracles, that's a separate discussion.
4. Same as #2.
Explain my question? Guidance from my spiritual advisors is to see midrashim as ahistorical. I We (humans) tells kids fanciful stories that they don't question because they don't understand the universe, and this is common place. Christians have Santa Claus, and when Christian kids grow up, they are informed that it was completely made up and there's actually zero basis to think that such a thing occurs. Muslims have the story of Muhammed and a winged horse (as a non-Muslim, I'll admit that I'm not entirely clear what the various stories are) and when they grow up, they are not debriefed -- this is something they are told to continue believing.
Jews have both types of stories. We say that Eliyahu visits the circumcision and we say that Jonah was saved by some form of a large sea creature and also that the daughter of Pharaoh stretched out her hand and that rocks were arguing to get under Jacob's head. We are told that Jacob's eyes opened after he was dead during an argument at the Cave of the Patriarchs and that Naftali ran like the wind (or rather, like a nimble deer) faster than ordinarily possible and we are told that the Nile river turned to blood, and many other stories.
I wonder why we don't believe in Jesus' resurrection or that he was born of a virgin? Is it because we lack the mesorah or because we see such things as silly? When we are faced with great rabbis in high positions (such as R' Lord Jonathan Sacks and R' Hershel Schachter) saying that the story of Adam + Eve are not to be taken literally, the question is why? Sacks is on record, on video, discussing this with Dawkins, but he's dead now and so we probably can't gain clarity on this point. Why did he say that we can look to these stories as ahistorical myths? As you said here and above, either directly or by implication, if we can accept any miracle, then we can accept many miracles. And if we cannot accept Adam + Eve, then why can't we? If it's because it's a silly story, then why can't we reject anything and everything based on a scale of silliness, rather than having to fall back on a claim of tradition. It seems to me that no authorities in the religious tradition explained any fanciful texts as ahistorical until such time as it became untenable to do so in light of greater understanding of the universe.
This is, as explained by Neil deGrasse Tyson, similar to the ever receding God of the Gaps. Doctors of religion had no problem understanding things as they were written until such time as they could no longer get away with it and still be taken seriously. You, HGL, seem to be able to extend your credulity more than most.
In this regard, I find partial rationalism as the most difficult position to take. Lawrence Kelemen railed against atheism, but I think he missed the point because as I see it, all the staunch and strident atheists are just being firm in their rejection of poor evidence as they see it. They are not strident in saying there is no god -- rather, they are strident that there's no good evidence. They are as firm in their atheism as they are in their a-fairy-ism. Ben Shapiro said that if NdGT is to be accepted in his claim of agnosticism, then many religious people also fall into that category. NdGT would agree, and respond that, indeed, everyone is necessarily an agnostic, even if they don't know it.
And by reading and hearing R' Sacks, it certainly seems like he's in agreement with this.
If we don't believe in Jesus's resurrection, it's NOT because we prima facie see miracles stories as silly. As Jews, we do believe in resurrection.
I can't answer for Rabbi Sacks, and see no reason to. He is completely misguided, plain and simple. Do you feel the need to answer for all rabbis, including hassidic rabbis, who say things you feel are completely misguided?
Secular people are just as credulous as anybody else, and believe all sorts of ridiculous things, like that men are sometimes really women when they feel like it, and will give all sorts of justifications for their ridiculous beliefs.
Atheists have a belief system just as much as religious people, but are less honest in admitting it. A belief that there is no evidence of God is as much of a belief as anything else.
This is how you would teach to kids, but how do you understand it?
Well, I think the main part is the lesson. And the main lesson is עלי יניח הצדיק את ראשו. That even the stones of the field wanted to serve Yaakov Avinu. But of course it is much deeper than that, we can ask why this lesson is taught here specifically, and in this way? What else can we learn from this? That interests me more than if the stones really talked (and unlike other places, a miracle doesn't necessarily seem to be the main point here. But I could be wrong.)
What does it mean to you, HGL, that to teach lessons we need to make up stories? Because if you said above that these can be understood non-literally, but that the message is still true, then is it just a tool to train children?
It's like taking a group one wants to be bigoted against (Jews, blacks, minorities, homosexuals, etc) and telling a story where they are the villain, and deriving the moral of the story as "see, the ________ is bad because look at what they did" or "look what happened to them." But then upon further scrutiny, you admit that the story is made up, but the lesson is true.
To me, we should derive lessons from data, not from anecdotes. The plural of anecdotes isn't evidence. But even putting that aside, let's say anecdotes were good evidence. If when pressured, you admit that the anecdote is false but that you still want to learn the lesson, where are you learning that lesson from? Doesn't it now become transparent that the lesson was what you started with, and that it wasn't an outcome of anything other than bigotry?
We see references made to both ancient Egypt and Sodom, that homosexuality was practiced. As though homosexuality is the proof that theses places were bad, steeped in immorality. But is that what you really think? Is that what anyone really thinks, other than being told to think that by their religion? I would think that this would mean you could detect immorality in a person even if you didn't know that they were homosexuals -- because what else would it mean to say that they are immoral? I wonder. There are many people today who are gay and yet you'd never know if if they didn't say anything. To me, it seems that the claim of homosexuality being prevalent in ancient Egypt and Sodom were more claims of how bad the places were, but I don't know...I wasn't there.
"To me, we should derive lessons from data, not from anecdotes."
"Doesn't it now become transparent that the lesson was what you started with, and that it wasn't an outcome of anything other than bigotry?"
Using this logic, we should rid ourselves of the entire corpus of human literature, and just have a list of a couple hundred lessons in its place. Narratives are vastly important in impressing upon us, and shaping our thought.
see my previous response to you
@HappyGoLucky,
Who authored the “Midrash”.? What are their names, their birth and death dates, and a bit of their life histories.
Which ones? But you raise a good point. Why does Rashi never bring Midrash Rabboh in Bamidbor or Devorim? The answer is those midroshim were authoured completely differently from Midrash Rabboh on Bereishis. Despite the same name.
Why were they authored differently? Did Wellhausen analyze the styles and find discrepancies? Why couldn't some works of an author survive and others get lost? That happened countless times.
But Maharitz Chajes in his introduction to Midrash points out that Rashi never cites Shemos Raba.
I think that the (genuine) Yerushalmi on Kodoshim (mentioned by Rambam) had the same author(s) as the other sections of the Yerushalmi did, only they survived and it didn't.
@HappyGiLucky,
Nice response failing to respond to my question.
All the Midrashim. Who are the authors? When and where did they live? Give us some snippets of their life history.
We can take that job for the right price.
Being repulsed is not unique to Jews. The most extreme adherents to any belief system are repulsed by those who don't share their belief system. It doesn't make you Jewish - it makes you an extremist. It doesn't make the object of your revulsion bad, you understand. It's a phobia, really.
Oh, I know it's not unique to Jews. It's not even unique to religion, most secular modern people would be proud to say they are repulsed by racism. Is that also too extremist for you?
But what constitutes "racism?" For an average person, not overly brainwashed, there is a commitment to equal rights.
For an extremist - racism is in every nook and cranny of human existence. They are committed to "fighting" it.
I've been both people. I realized at some point that extremism said more about my own hidden needs, my own hurts, my own issues - than anything else.
I think we all see, for instance, the manichean notion of hurling homosexuals off buildings in Iran (for religious reasons) as saying a bit more about the hurlers than the hurled.
Part of the Enlightenment was to shine a light on this aspect of human nature. Part of religion (and all movements) is to shut off that light.
Ok, you are consistent! I have (some) respect for that.
You are aware that the Mesillas Yesharim at the beginning of the book brings this Midrash to prove that the world serves the tzadikim. This lesson is what I believe Rav Aharon Feldman finds crucial.
Are you saying that the Mesilas Yeshorim means it litrally or is he using it in a non-literal sense for its message?
I'm not taking sides, and maybe he isn't either. The point is this is the message he learns from the pasuk. Same as Rashi.
Narrator: He was not
@HappyGoLucky,
Yes he was. I’m against it.
https://youtu.be/29E6GbYdB1c
Overwhelmingly, children raised on miraculous stories have no problem with them PROVIDED that they aren't later confronted with a skeptical environment, whether from parents, school, or an intense relationship with secular society. There are circles in which being afraid like this for the future is just crying "wolf". We need to help everyone, and for those exposed to skepticism it's sometimes necessary to de-miracle-ize stories, where authorities allow.
Rambam says that the planets ARE sentient. R. Feldman says stones were sentient. The mystics and rationalists have made peace.
"Peshuto Shel Mikra, a very popular five-volume work which offers... traditional interpretations WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THE PLAIN MEANING of Scripture."
I am I the only one who is picking up on the outright kefira insinuated in this sentence?? The message seems quite loud that even the simple interpretations offered by the Rishonim are not really the 'real' interpretation. Just 'close' to the 'plain meaning'. But the plain meaning is how Kugel understands it. Or the Sadducees. Or the Karaites. But not the 'traditional interpretations'.
עפ"ל!
What about how the Rashbam understands its? Ibn Ezra? Targum? All much more 'close to the plain meaning of scripture' than midrash. Is that kefirah? What about chassidishe torah - far far away from the even the simple interperatations offered by the Rishonim. Acceptable? Are non-rishonim even permitted to interpret scripture according to you? If not, you will need to empty your bookshelf. Rav Hirsch made a point of deliberately explaining pesukim without rishonim, being mechadesh peshat himself based on his knowledge of nach. Acceptable? Where do you draw the line? If the acharonim can interpret scripture. can Rabbi Lord Dr Sacks? You must be aware that in nach, the rishonim and acahronim frequently and deliberately interpret pesukim differently from the gemorroh. Radak does it the whole time. Acceptable?
Uh hello? Anybody home? The Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and Radak etc. are PRECISELY the 'traditional interpretations' that the Peshuto Shel Mikra chumash draws from! Yet according to Natan, they are only CLOSE to the plain meaning of Scripture, but not the plain meaning itself!
You shift between different terminology, 'meaning', 'plain' and 'interpretation' which makes debate difficult.
Is it kefirah to state:
The plain meaning of ayin tachas ayin is an 'eye for an eye" namely knock out the eye.
Yes or no?
I assume you don't want to make onkelos a kofer. See shemos 21,25.
Not sure what's so complicated here! I just quoted Natan's sentence and showed how he is implying that the 'traditional interpretations' are 'close' to the plain meaning, but it seems that he feels that they are not the meaning itself. I never said a word about Onkelos.
Mekharker,
You wrote: “traditional interpretations WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THE PLAIN MEANING of Scripture."
I am I [sic] the only one who is picking up on the outright kefira insinuated in this sentence?? The message seems quite loud that even the simple interpretations offered by the Rishonim are not really the 'real' interpretation. Just 'close' to the 'plain meaning'. ”
I think you might be reading too deeply in to what RNS said in that sentence you quoted and took umbrage with.
By “Plain meaning” RNS might just mean the simple straightforward explanation ala Occam’s razor. The simple meaning requiring the least gymnastics.
In that sentence you quoted, RNS might not be making a Judgment call as to “real meaning” at all.
The possuk states: וַיִּקַּח֙ מֵאַבְנֵ֣י הַמָּקֹ֔ום
Sefaria translates that as “Taking one of the stones of that place.”
To me that is a poor translation; it seems like the translation should be: “He took [something not explicitly stated] from the stones of that place.”
What is that unstated thing? since the thing is unstated:
a) it might be one stone,
b) it might be multiple stones.
The midrash in question argues on Sefaria and says that it was multiple stones (based on the word “Avnei” (stones) even though the actual word in the possuk was “m’avnei” (from the stones)) and looks at the later possuk which says: וַיִּקַּ֤ח אֶת־הָאֶ֙בֶן֙ and concludes that now the “Even” is stone (singular) so there must have been a miracle.
Where as occam’s razor might say the second possuk which says “the stone” (singular) simply clarified what the unstated thing that was originally “taken from the stones” had been. Thus it had always been one stone that he went to sleep on and woke up on. (The plain meaning)
This would not be a statement by RNS as to which meaning is “Real” just which is “plain”
It is possible. Although based on other comments of his in the past where he seems to sympathize with bible critics, I don't think so.
When there are numeros and conflicting interpretations to the text, doesn't it mean that we don't know the real meaning of it?
It looks to me like you somewhat misrepresent what he is saying. You say "First is that they dethrone Rashi as being the sole legitimate peshat." While he does say that his first issue is that the book argues with Rashi on what is "peshuto shel mikra", he clearly does not mean this in the sense of what is a legitimate peshat, but what is the 'basic' peshat, i.e. the default position. You are (seemingly) using peshat in the colloquial sense of "an interpretation" (e.g. "here's a nice peshat") whereas he is using it in the more specific sense of "the basic interpretation" (e.g. "zeh peshuto..."). He clearly says he is happy for the other peshat to be quoted as a "yesh omrim", i.e. he says it is fine to learn it, just that "the mesorah" says that Rashi is the basic peshat.
To me this is quite a big difference. It means that where you say "it is absolutely crucial to Judaism to teach that there were sentient stones arguing and jostling about which one should move to the desired position." he is insisting that this be taught as the basic peshat in the pasuk, but not that you can't also say "some people say that it actually means...".
(Personally I disagree, it is hard to argue that this case of the story of the stones is anything but a medrashic enterpretation. The pasuk doesn't say or really allude to it at all. But that's tangential to my point that he is clearly not claiming it as the sole peshat but the basic peshat.)
With imbibing appropriate single malt, the stones in my garden move and even levitate. I will listen more closely and note if they chat too.
never said any of the things you are PROJECTING on to me. Seriously, take your own advice: get a life. You'll sleep better.
Dr, is it crucial to Judaism that the Creator of the universe appeared upon a mountain and spoke to an entire nation of people? Is it crucial to believe that all of the water in the land of Egypt turned to blood, or that a staff turned into a snake? Your ridicule of the necessity of believing in so-called sentient stones is concerning and consequential to many cores of our faith.