Sliding, Speaking, Sentient Stones
Sliding, Speaking, Sentient Stones
The new Fundamental of Faith
A few weeks ago I reported on a book ban against Peshuto Shel Mikra, a very popular five-volume work which offers, alongside Rashi, traditional interpretations which are close to the plain meaning of Scripture. Rather than fizzle out, this has blown up into an enormous controversy. There are endless letters and pamphlets being produced both in favor of the work and against it. There are also numerous letters being issued regarding the signatories to the original ban, some claiming that they regret signing and others insisting that they stand by their signatures.
I haven’t been able to wade through all of the material, but one thing in particular caught my eye. Rav Aharon Feldman, following his original signature to the order that one must get the book out of the house, wrote a letter on Kislev 21 in which he claims that he never signed that one must get the book out of one’s house, just that it should not be studied (which he subsequently retracted on 10 Teves, insisting that actually one really must get the book out of the house).
Anyway, in this letter, he details his two objections to the books. First is that they dethrone Rashi as being the sole legitimate peshat. Second is that they cause the reader to lose appreciation for the sanctity of the forefathers and the sheer wickedness of the bad characters in the Torah, which one gets from Rashi. To illustrate this, he points out that Peshuto Shel Mikra presents alternative explanations to two famous explanations of Rashi: One about Eisav being wicked from the womb, and another with an account of the stones upon which Yaakov rested having an argument about which one of them should be under his head (Bereishit 28:11, based on a derasha in Chullin 91b).
It’s astonishing. Here is a brilliant and distinguished Torah scholar, with an American high school education, on the Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah, insisting that it is absolutely crucial to Judaism to teach that there were sentient stones arguing and jostling about which one should move to the desired position. (He does not specify whether stones in general are sentient and can communicate and move, or if these stones were brought to life by Hashem specially to have this argument.)
Does Rav Feldman himself really believe this? It’s possible; I remember myself how in those circles, it’s perfectly normative to believe that the world was completely supernatural in the days of the Torah. Or he may believe that he believes it, even if he doesn’t actually believe it; such was the impression that I received of him 18 years ago when I asked him if he really believes that mice are generated from dirt.
Another possibility is that he doesn’t actually believe in sentient talking and moving stones, but he believes that it is crucial from an educational perspective for people to be taught this. This would stem from his stated need to teach that the Avot are super-special, and/or from a concern that if people try to avoid supernatural explanations, they’ll end up like Spinoza, or worse - like Slifkin. (I’m worse than Spinoza, because Spinoza denied the authority of God and Torah, whereas I deny the authority of Gedolim and Daas Torah.)
While such an approach is more understandable, it is still deeply problematic. First of all, there are plenty of Rishonim, including not just rationalists, but even Tosafos, who say that the peshat does not refer to sentient rocks; why is it crucial to only teach the supernatural view? Second, insisting that people have to accept extraordinary and bizarre miracles in order to be good Jews is going to drive many people away from Judaism.
Eighteen years ago, when the charedi Gedolim took their first stand against rational thought, hundreds and possibly thousands of people left the charedi world as a result (which, as I now see it, was a very good thing). I wonder what the effects of this latest campaign will be.
There's a story about a Chassidic Rebbe (I believe it was about Rabbi Nachum of Chernobyl, who was a heavy-set man) who sat down in a wicker chair. The wicker chair wasn't able to bear his weight, and it tore, with the Rebbe falling through the webbing of the chair.
He mused: "It seems I'm a tzaddik as great as Ya'akov Avinu! When I sat on the chair, the holes in the seat started to argue: each one wanted that I should sit on it! So, they all decided to become one big hole, and I fell through!"
I wish I knew where to find all of these “letters and pamphlets” as the topic of peshat and drash is one that is very interesting for me.
I find this whole controversy to be very disturbing. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding on the definition of “peshat” and the nature of Rashi’s commentary on the Torah. The scholarly studies on these topics are vast with probably hundreds of academic articles written on them. Generally, “peshat” or “peshto shel mikrah” as understood by the Rishonim and later commentators is understood to be the plain meaning of the text, taking into account elements such as grammar, syntax, and most importantly context. Rashi’s commentary is often assumed to be a peshat commentary, but this idea should be surprising to anyone familiar with it as it consists of about 2/3 midrashic material. This misunderstanding is based on a partial reading of Rashi’s programmatic statement that he makes on Beraishis 3:8 – “אני לא באתי אלא לפשוטו של מקרא ולאגדה המתישבת דברי המקרא”. For some reason people only see the first half of this statement and think that Rashi is only coming to explain peshat. But he is actually saying that he is doing two things: peshat and midrashim. Many of Rashi’s comments include both aspects, for example, in parshas Shemos “ותשלח את אמתה”. Most school children know the midrash that Rashi quotes from the Talmud that Paroh’s daughter’s arm miraculously extended, but Rashi also states a peshat comment that אמתה refers to her maidservant. From the many examples where Rashi contrasts peshat and derash we can see the difference between them. In the example of the rocks arguing it is clear that Rashi himself would consider this one of his midrashic interpretations. So for someone to argue that we must accept Rashi’s comment as peshat is quite bizarre.
Incidentally, the chumash פשוטו של מקרא is not an exclusively peshat oriented work. Several of its interpretations are midrashic, for example, that the servant Avraham sent to find a wife for Yitzchak was Eliezer and that when the Torah describes Yaakov as a “dweller of tents” it means he was learning torah. So I don’t understand the fervent opposition to this chumash as it seems the authors are not staunchly ideological peshatists, but rather suggest peshat interpretations where Rashi quotes midrashic ones. It should be no more controversial than the Rashbam’s commentary.